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Abstract: - A statistical database system is a database system that contains information about individuals 
(companies, organisations) which enable its authorized users to retrieve aggregate statistics such as sample total, 
mean and count. The security problem for a statistical database is to limit the use of the database so that only 
statistical information is available to an authorized statistical user and no sequence of queries is sufficient to 
infer protected information about any individual. If, however, as a result of a statistical query, individual 
confidential information is obtained by a statistical user, then the database is said to be compromised. In order to 
prevent compromise, we use a knowledge based system approach. A statistical user can pose only statistical 
queries to the database.  The knowledge based system will infer a query result by answering questions from the 
statistical user in such a way that the individual information is kept confidential. Earlier models modelled SDB 
compromise using two kinds of knowledge [7]. In this paper we enhance this model by including another 
important knowledge, namely, legal knowledge, and we describe an implementation of a knowledge base that 
supports the decision making for the protection of privacy in statistical databases, while taking into account not 
only the working and (known) supplementary knowledge but also legal knowledge. 
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1   Introduction 
A statistical database (SDB) is a database that is used 
for statistical queries (aggregates, averages, counts) 
on subsets of the database entities.  The security 
problem for statistical databases is to limit the use of 
a statistical database so that, while statistical 
information is available, no sequence of queries is 
sufficient to infer protected information about any 
individual. When such information is inferred, the 
SDB is said to be compromised.  
For example, using the sample data in Table 1, an 
authorized user may issue a query such as:  the 
number of females in Smalltown and receive the 
result “1”.  This is illustrated in Figure 1. Smalltown 
has a very small population of just one individual 
who may be identified so that answering a statistical 
query about Smalltown will divulge information 
about just one individual, contrary to the purpose of a 
statistical database which is to provide statistical 
information about groups or subpopulations of the 
database, not individuals. 
To date, some measure of security for statistical 
databases has been achieved with various noise 
addition and query restriction techniques. Noise 
addition techniques involve either input perturbation 
or output perturbation or data swapping. Such 
techniques have been applied by [1], [2] and [3]. 
Query restriction techniques can be based on query 
set size, query set overlap, partitioning, cell 
suppression, auditing and have been applied by [4] 
and [5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One drawback of the restriction techniques is that 
they are fixed techniques and will not release any 
confidential information, whenever a query is 
deemed unanswerable due to potential compromise, 
regardless of any other considerations.  
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In some jurisdictions, the security of statistical 
database is important but at the same time revealing 
the answer may be more vital for the “public good” 
than would be the continued provision of 
confidentiality of individuals. Figure 2 illustrates an 
authorized user issuing the same query as in Figure 1. 
Instead of simply answering the query if it is safe and 
not answering it if it could result in a compromise, 
this time a knowledge based system (KBS) 
intervenes and prompts the user to see if a public 
health issue is at stake. If it is then the system may 
 
 
 
 
release the confidential information to an authorized 
user. Since the Result from the SDB is not 
necessarily passed on to the user, we denote the 
response obtained by the user from the SDB via the 
KBS as Result*. It may be the same as the Result but 
for legal reasons Result* may be different from 
Result.  Such a situation is not uncommon and occurs 
for example in Australia, where the privacy laws  
 
 
Name City  Sex Status Age Child Salary 
White Smalltown F S 41 1 48700 
White Brisbane M M 19 4 16400 
Mlynar Adelaide F W 61 7 30000 
Brown Sydney F M 36 2 30000 
Baker Sydney F M 25 0 40000 
Baker Brisbane F D 25 1 17000 
Peter Melbourne M S 29 2 40900 
Brown Sydney M D 37 3 25000 
Black Melbourne M D 50 0 17000 
Ling Hobart M M 60 0 15000 
Ling Perth  M S 42 2 16500 
White Brisbane F S 50 3 25500 
Brown Canberra F S 25 1 25000 
Brown Perth F W 44 2 22400 
 
 
 
allow an individual’s privacy to be breached in the 
event of a public health benefit according to section 
95A of the Privacy Act 1988.  
Securing a database using a knowledge based system 
enables some context-dependency in dealing with a 
database for those authorized users who need private 
information for public safety.  
In the next section we discuss sources of knowledge 
for securing a SDB, namely, working knowledge, 
supplementary knowledge and legal knowledge. 
Section 3 briefly discusses knowledge based systems. 
Section 4 completes the paper with conclusion and 
directions for further research. 
 
 
2 Sources of Knowledge  
According to [7], two sources of knowledge useful 
for perpetrating a compromise of a SDB have been 
identified as working knowledge and supplementary 
knowledge. Working knowledge includes knowledge 
about the attributes and tables in a database.  
For example, an authorized user needs to know that 
the attribute labeled “sal” represents an individual’s 
annual salary. This is working knowledge. Typically, 
some attributes in a SDB represent publicly known, 
non-confidential data and others represent 
confidential data. Knowledge of the confidential 
status of each attribute is also working knowledge.  
Supplementary knowledge is not working knowledge 
but is background or context knowledge about the 
external world that could be used to infer data that 
represents a compromise.  
For example, an authorized user may personally 
know most of the inhabitants of Smalltown. That 
supplementary knowledge could be applied to the 
result of a query to enable the user to infer the identity 
of the resident over forty that had an income of 
$750,000 last year. 
Knowledge about the legislative context of the SDB 
is also a kind of supplementary knowledge. In 
Australia, the Privacy Act 1988 protects an 
individual’s privacy. However, an individual’s right 
to privacy is curtailed if the data may be beneficial to 
a police investigation. The supplementary knowledge 
brought to bear on the Smalltown individual will be 
overridden by legal knowledge that the 
confidentiality is to be breached for a criminal 
investigation.  
In this paper, to our best knowledge for the first time 
in the context of security of statistical databases, we 
consider including this new type of knowledge, the 
KBS
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legal knowledge. Such knowledge is not part of the 
working knowledge nor is it in the same category as 
supplementary knowledge, but rather, is orthogonal 
to the other two types of knowledge that can pertain 
to the problem of security of statistical databases. 
Interpolating from our knowledge of real-life 
scenarios, we can assume that the three types of 
knowledge are independent of each other.  
We will next consider in turn each of the three types 
of knowledge in more detail. We shall assume 
throughout the rest of this paper that Salary is the 
only confidential attribute in the database. 
 
 
2.1 Working Knowledge 
Working knowledge is the user’s knowledge of the 
attributes and their values in the database.  The user 
should have knowledge of the non-confidential 
attributes in order to avoid meaningless queries. He 
or she needs to know the form in which the attributes 
are represented in the database.  
For example, in Table 2, there is an attribute which 
specifies an individual belongs to a particular 
location and this attribute is called “City” in the 
database.  
The user needs to know the legal values of attributes 
and also whether they are recorded using lowercase 
or uppercase letters or in numeric or abbreviated 
form.  
All this knowledge is necessary for the efficient use 
of a statistical database. Otherwise, precious time 
would be spent in trying to guess the correct form in 
which the name of attribute is placed in the database, 
for example, is the value of attribute used to hold 
values for Sex M or Male or male or 1? 
 
 
Attribute Aj Values |Aj| 
City Smalltown, Brisbane, 
Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Hobart, Perth, Canberra 
8 
Sex M, F 2 
Status S, M, D, W 4 
Child 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 8 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Supplementary Knowledge 
Supplementary knowledge is the pre-knowledge of 
the user about the database which is not directly 
derived from the database but from external sources. 
The three basic types of supplementary knowledge 
used in dealing with database compromise are 
classified as supplementary knowledge of type 1, 
type II and type III [7].  
A user has supplementary knowledge of type I, if he 
has knowledge to build a characteristic formula 
which uniquely identifies the individual or a group of 
individuals in a database.  
For example, a malicious Smalltown resident who 
wishes to confirm that none of the single women in 
Smalltown have children may initially issue a query 
to discover the average number of children to single 
mothers: 
AVG(number of children)  
WHERE (City = Smalltown AND Sex = F AND 
status=S)  
and receive the result => 0.25.   
Supplementary knowledge leads the resident to infer 
that at least one single mother exists in Smalltown. A 
count query confirms that there are four single 
women in Smalltown. Supplementary knowledge 
leads the resident to infer that the only way the 
average number of children could be 0.25 is if there 
were 3 women with no children and one with a child.  
The resident recalls the name of four single women 
likely to be in the SDB but does not know which one 
has the child. A query that lists the average age of the 
Smalltown children with single mothers yields a 
result of => 41. The resident again draws on 
supplementary knowledge of the age of the four 
single mothers and infers that the one with a child 
must be Ms White. 
A user has supplementary knowledge of type II, if a 
user has knowledge about the confidential X-value of 
particular individual in a database.  
For example, if the user knows the Salary of Ms. 
White living in Smalltown is $48700 then the user 
has supplementary knowledge of type II. Such 
knowledge can be obtained directly from other 
sources external to the SDB or as a data inference, for 
example, by issuing two queries: a query which 
counts the Salary of all the persons in the database, 
and a query that gives the sum of Salaries of all 
persons aged over 20, 
 
SUM(Salary of all) 
and 
SUM(Salary of all individuals aged over 20) 
 
Since Ms. White of Brisbane is the only individual 
included in the first query and not in the second one, 
by taking the difference of the answers to the two 
queries, we can infer that Ms White’s Salary is 
$48700. That is, if the (exact) results of both the 
queries are released then the statistical database will 
be compromised. 
Table 2 Attribute values for database in Table 1
Proceedings of the 4th WSEAS Int. Conf. on Information Security, Communications and Computers, Tenerife, Spain, December 16-18, 2005 (pp180-185)
The supplementary knowledge of type III is the 
knowledge of the user other than type I and type II. 
An example of supplementary knowledge of type III 
is a functional dependency. For example, consider a 
database containing attributes called Position and 
Level. It is possible that there is a relationship 
between the values for attributes Position, Level and 
Salary, for example, the combination of Position and 
Level may functionally determine the Salary. If the 
user knows somebody’s Position is “Programmer” 
and the Level is “level6”, then it leads to an exact 
compromise even if we keep the attribute Salary 
itself confidential. The problem occurs  when Salary 
is a confidential attribute while Position and Level 
are not and when there is the functional dependency 
FD{Position, Level} -> Salary (such situation is not 
uncommon for example, in government 
organizations).  
 
 
2.3 Legal Knowledge 
The decision tree in Figure 4 represents privacy 
guidelines [10]. According to Australian privacy law, 
if some confidential information about individual is 
needed to be used for social welfare than it can be 
shown to the user.  
As shown in the decision tree, the record is shown to 
the user if the information about an individual is used 
for preventing serious threats to an individual or the 
public or for investigating a serious crime.  
If the information is used for research relevant to 
public health or safety and if it is feasible to obtain 
the individual’s consent then the knowledge based 
system will advise that consent from compromised 
individuals should be obtained from an Ethics 
committee. If the committee agrees to show the 
record and it is used to prevent crime or is necessary 
for enforcement of laws relating to the confiscation 
of the proceeds of crime or necessary for protecting 
public revenue or necessary for preventing improper  
conduct than the confidential record  can be shown to 
user.  
For any other reason the information would remain 
confidential. 
 
 
3 Knowledge Base for Secure SDBs 
A knowledge-based system is a computer system that 
models real world knowledge. Typically, knowledge 
is heuristic in nature based on rules of thumb rather 
than absolute certainties.  
Generally, an expert system that requires a 
knowledge base contains a database of extracted 
human knowledge. Building this expert system 
knowledge base is a difficult task as the 
representation of knowledge must be precise and 
accurate. In our approach presented in this paper, 
there are three sources of knowledge, namely, 
working knowledge, supplementary knowledge and 
legal knowledge. 
The significance of knowledge based system in 
securing statistical database is that it considers real 
world knowledge about the database. The user will 
query the database and the knowledge based system 
will find out the user’s purpose to use the 
information.  
The knowledge based system does so by asking 
several questions to determine if the compromise 
should occur, if a release of the confidential 
information about an individual is used for public or 
any individual safety or for public good then it will 
release the information. In the case where KBS finds 
that the information is confidential and it may be used 
in order to harm any individual or to threaten any 
individual’s life then the query result will not be 
shown to the user. 
 
 
4   Conclusion and Further Research 
The security of statistical databases using query 
restriction and perturbation techniques is rigid and 
aims to prevent any compromise of protected 
information about individuals.  
In some cases, where security is an important issue 
but at the same time confidential information needs 
to be used for social good then, according to 
Australian Privacy Law,  it must be released to the 
authorized user. This can be done using a knowledge 
based system which after receiving the response(s) 
from the user for corresponding questions, decides 
whether to release the confidential information 
according to privacy law requirements. 
Currently, we are implementing the knowledge base 
that encodes privacy law and supplementary 
knowledge using a decision and argument tree 
representation described in [12]. 
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